I am a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Massachusetts Amherst. My recent work has mostly centered on the issues related to our limited and biased means of accessing the world on the one hand and scientific realism on the other. I find myself especially attracted to approaches which take certain limited ways of accessing the world to be guarantors of, rather than obstacles to, knowledge. I spend a lot of time thinking about two questions. First, what distinguishes the good limited ways of accessing the world versus the bad limited ways of accessing the world? Second, what affect does the answer to the first question have on various debates across philosophy? For example, consider how our cognitive biases lead us to make all sorts of mistakes. This doesn’t prevent them from aiding us in gaining knowledge period. In fact, it’s often the case that they can be successfully applied across a limited range of cases. I’m interested in what makes the difference.

My current work has played out in my areas of specialization (philosophy of science, epistemology, metaphysics, and metaphilosophy) through the development of an approach to philosophy that places our limited ways of accessing the world at the front and center. I’m looking forward to exploring how this plays out in philosophy of medicine (especially philosophy of mental health), philosophy of biology, philosophy of artificial intelligence, and philosophy of religion.

When I'm not doing philosophy, I spend my time out in the woods with my family, playing guitar, cooking, and playing darts.

Contact: cruz davis [at] umass [dot] edu