Upcoming Events

METHOD, THEORY & REALITY

Upcoming Events (Fall 2023 & Spring 2024)

(If you are interested in attending any of the following meetings, please email us for the Zoom link!)

Thursday October 26, 4-6 PM (EST):

Peter Tan (Fordham)

"Analogical Distance in Scientific Representation"

ABSTRACT. Discussions of the epistemology and methodological foundations of scientific modeling sometimes treat all scientific models as if they are metaphors or analogies. I argue that this treatment misses out on important nuances regarding the distinct roles that metaphorical or analogical reasoning can play in scientific modeling. This paper then develops a taxonomy of analogical "distance" in scientific representation ('distance', of course, also being a metaphor) that aims to properly distinguish between roles for metaphor and analogy that are more or less representational. Then, I show why any such taxonomy matters and how it can help resolve or improve existing debates in the epistemology of scientific modeling.
Zoom Link -- Passcode: 792136 BROKEN! Instead use: https://umass-amherst.zoom.us/j/91811632333

Tuesday November 21, 4.5-6.5 (EST):

“How Aristotelian Forms can be Simple and Complex”

- ABSTRACT. There appears to be a tension between two key aspects of the way Aristotle conceived of form (eidos). On the one hand, form is meant to serve as the unifying principle of matter-form compounds, and in order to fulfill this role, Aristotle seems to think that form itself must be simple, where minimally, this involves being incomposite in some sense. On the other hand, Aristotle is committed to the view that forms are definable, not just nominally, but really. But it is generally true that things with real definitions are complex in some sense; they can be analyzed into further entities. For example, it is generally agreed that the real definition of water is H2O, and water quite literally can be broken down into hydrogen and oxygen. In this paper, I tease apart two distinct ways of being complex and simple such that Aristotle can retain his commitment to the simplicity of form while also maintaining that they are complex in that they have real definitions.
- Zoom Link -- No Passcode Required

Thursday December 7, 4-6 PM (EST)

"Deflationist Cognitive Science"

ABSTRACT. According to a version of deflationism about truth, attributions of truth-conditional contents to mental states do not play a robust role in the best scientific explanations of behavior. Theories that appear to invoke truth-conditional contents can be paraphrased in terms of less metaphysically problematic notions, without loss in explanatory power. This talk develops a challenge for representational realism based on the availability of such deflationist paraphrases, building on the work of Hartry Field and Frances Egan. I consider a number of popular attempts to clarify the explanatory role of content and argue that none of them yields a satisfactory response to the deflationist challenge, as I understand it. I end by presenting a more promising response on behalf of the realist, but show that it rests on potentially controversial assumptions about the role of truth conditions in structuring neural mechanisms.
Zoom Link -- No Passcode Required

Wednesday February 21, 5.5-7.5 PM (EST)

"Scientific Episodes as Epistemic Situations"

ABSTRACT. The notion of a scientific episode is pervasive in the history and philosophy of science. Case studies examine the scientific methods used in various scientific episodes, discussions of theory change investigate the scientific theories that are replaced or superseded in a particular scientific episode, and the debate over the use of values in science seeks to determine whether these values are essential components of scientific reasoning in an episode. Scientific episodes are explicitly invoked in discussions of scientific progress to help determine whether progress has been made. Despite this, it is not clear what a scientific episode is, precisely. This paper will answer those questions by examining the ways in which the notion of scientific episodes is used throughout the philosophy of science. In the end, I will argue that a scientific episode is defined by the epistemic situation of the relevant scientific community at a time and in a culture that is relevant to the philosophical investigation involved.
Zoom Link -- No Passcode Required

Wednesday March 13, 3-5 PM (EST)

Raimund Pils (University of Salzburg)

"From Scientific Realism to Epistemic Autonomy: Reframing Science Reporting"

ABSTRACT. There is no consensus among philosophers of science about how to interpret scientific theories. Epistemic voluntarists argue that multiple options of scientific realism and anti-realism are equally rational. However, this is in stark contrast to how scientific findings are currently reported in science communication. I will propose a new model of science communication built on the idea of epistemic autonomy which better aligns with widely accepted communication norms, such as consensus reporting.
Zoom Link -- No Passcode Required

Wednesday April 10, 6-8 PM (EST)

Daniel Swaim (Kansas State University)

"Representation & Commitment: A Defense of Ontic Explanation"

ABSTRACT. In this paper I defend the ontic conception of scientific explanation. Over the course of the history of philosophy of science, there has been substantial disagreement among philosophers over the nature of scientific explanation. For the most part, philosophers of science have divided into two camps, one endorsing an ontic conception, which emphasizes that explanations are worldly entities, the other endorsing epistemic conception, understanding explanations rather as representations. Here I offer a defense of ontic explanations, specifically emphasizing misunderstandings of the notion of representation. Explanations are not representations, but representations are central to explanatory acts, and the successful among such acts direct us toward the proper objects of ontological commitment, and those objects are, ultimately, explanations.
Zoom Link -- No Passcode Required